Finite model theory

7. Logics IV

In this section we look into yet further logics. These are motivated both by theory and applications.

Definition 7.1

Let τ be a relational vocabulary. A **conjunctive query** (or CQ) is a firstorder τ -formula $\exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n \chi$ where χ is a conjunction of relational atoms $R(t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ with $R \in \tau$ and t_1, \ldots, t_n are τ -terms. Conjunctive queries do not contain equality atoms $t_1 = t_2$. If a conjunctive query does not have free variables, it is called a **Boolean conjunctive query**.

Conjunctive queries are used in, e.g., database theory. For example, let τ be the relational vocabulary over the relational vocabulary

$$\{\operatorname{Book}, A_1, \ldots, A_n, B_1, \ldots, B_m, Y_1, \ldots, Y_\ell\}$$

where

- Book is a ternary relation symbol.
- A_1, \ldots, A_n are constant symbols (intuitively denoting author names).
- B_1, \ldots, B_m are constant symbols (book names).
- Y₁,..., Y_ℓ are constant symbols (denoting the years from, say, 1700 to 2020.)

Let \mathfrak{D} be a finite au-model whose domain is

$$\{A_1^{\mathfrak{D}},\ldots,A_n^{\mathfrak{D}},B_1^{\mathfrak{D}},\ldots,B_m^{\mathfrak{D}},Y_1^{\mathfrak{D}},\ldots,Y_\ell^{\mathfrak{D}}\}$$

such that the elements are separate, i.e., the domain size is $n + m + \ell$, and Book is some ternary relation containing some seet of triples (X, Y, Z) such that

- X is one of the elements $A_i^{\mathfrak{D}}$,
- Y is one of the elements $B_j^{\mathfrak{D}}$,
- Z is one of the elements $Y_k^{\mathfrak{D}}$.

The finite model \mathfrak{D} can be seen as a database, possibly encoding the contents of some small library. Now, let the constant symbol A_i be the name of some author, say, F. Scott Fitzgerald. Now the conjunctive query

 $\varphi(x) = \exists y \operatorname{Book}(A_i, x, y)$

returns the unary relation $\varphi^{\mathfrak{D}}$ containing precisely the book titles authored by F. Scott Fitzgerald and stored in the library \mathfrak{D} .

Let \mathfrak{D}' be the expansion of the τ -model \mathfrak{D} to the vocabulary $\tau \cup \{\text{Album}\}$. We assume that some of the constant symbols B_1, \ldots, B_m can also be album names, and we let $\text{Album}^{\mathfrak{D}'}$ contain triples (X, Y, Z) where X is one of the elements $A_i^{\mathfrak{D}} = A_i^{\mathfrak{D}'}$ while Y is some element $B_j^{\mathfrak{D}} = B_j^{\mathfrak{D}'}$ and Z some element $Y_k^{\mathfrak{D}} = Y_k^{\mathfrak{D}'}$. Write a conjunctive query that returns the set of people who have published both a book and an album during the same year.

The query

$$\chi(x) = \exists u \exists y \exists z \, (\operatorname{Book}(x, u, y) \land \operatorname{Album}(x, z, y)).$$

returns the set of people who have published a book and an album during some single year.

Let \mathfrak{D} a finite model over the vocabulary {Parent_of} where Parent_of is a binary relation. Intuitively, \mathfrak{D} is a simple genealogical database of where the elements are people and Parent_of contains the pairs (u, v) such that u is a parent of v. Now the conjunctive query

 $\varphi(x, y) = \exists z (Parent_of(x, z) \land Parent_of(z, y))$

returns the pairs (u, v) such that u is a grand parent of v.

Conjunctive queries are the most central querying framework studied in database theory. However, conjunctive queries are a rather weak fragment of first-order logic and thus come with obvious limitations. Indeed, consider the genealogical database from the previous slide. Consider the query $\psi_{ancestor}(x, y)$ that returns those pairs (u, v) such that u is an ancestor of v. We cannot write this as a conjunctive query, as we cannot define the transitive closure of a first-order formula even in first-order logic. Thus a CQ, in particular, is definitely not expressive enough.

For writing the ancestor query, we need a logic with capacities that go beyond that of first-order logic. For example the LFP-formula

$[lfp_{(S,(x,y))}Parent_of(x,y) \lor \exists z (Parent_of(x,z) \land S(z,y))](x,y)$

does the job. This is just the good old formula defining the transitive closure. However, for some purposes, LFP tends to be too expressive (as very expressive logics tend to be difficult and slow to work with in relation to applications, requiring generally too slow truth checking algorithms). A paradigmatic framework that srikes a balance between conjunctive queries and LFP is DATALOG which combines the idea of conjunctive queries and iterative fixed point constructions. We shall look into DATALOG.

DATALOG is somewhat technically messy and thus DATALOG will not appear in the exam but may appear in the exercises.

Let au be a relational vocabulary. A DATALOG-program is a list

$$X_1(x_{1,1},\ldots,x_{1,n_1}) := \varphi_1$$

$$\vdots$$

$$X_m(x_{m,1},\ldots,x_{m,n_m}) := \varphi_m$$

where each X_k is an n_k -ary relation symbol not in τ and each φ_k is a CQ over the vocabulary $\tau \cup \{X_1, \ldots, X_m\}$ and in the free variables $(x_{k,1}, \ldots, x_{k,n_k})$. The relation symbols X_1, \ldots, X_m are called IDBs (intensional databases) and thus sometimes the relation symbols in τ are called EDBs (extensional databases). Note carefully, some of the symbols X_1, \ldots, X_m can be the same (see the next page for an example where two of the first lines of a program begin with X_1).

Further Logics Each line

$X_i(x_{i,1},\ldots,x_{i,n_i})$:- φ_i

of a DATALOG-program is called a **rule**. The rule consists of the **head** $X_i(x_{i,1}, \ldots, x_{i,n_i})$, the symbol : – and the **body** φ_i which is a conjunctive query with exactly the free variables that occur also in the head. A rule with the **head variable** equal to the IDB X_i is called an X_i -**rule**. There can be several X_i -rules in the same program. For example, the following DATALOG-program over the vocabulary $\{P, S, R\}$

$X_1(x,y)$: -	R×y
$X_1(x,y)$: -	$\exists z (P(x) \land Sxzy \land X_1(x,y) \land X_2(x,x))$
$X_2(x,y)$: -	$\exists z(X_2(y,x) \land Rzz \land X_3(x))$
$X_3(x)$: -	$\exists z \exists u (R \times u \land X_1(x,z) \land X_2(x,u))$

contains two X_1 -rules. Note also that even though this is a DATALOGprogram over the vocabulary $\{R, S, P\}$, the CQs are allowed to contain relation symbols that are IDBs, i.e., the IDBs X_1, X_2, X_3 are allowed to occur in the rule bodies in addition to the EDBs R, S, P.

Note also that, as required, the heads of each rule of the program

$X_1(x,y)$: -	Rxy
$X_1(x,y)$: -	$\exists z (P(x) \land Sxzy \land X_1(x,y) \land X_2(x,x))$
$X_2(x,y)$: -	$\exists z(X_2(y,x) \land Rzz \land X_3(x))$
$X_3(x)$: -	$\exists z \exists u (R \times u \land X_1(x,z) \land X_2(x,u))$

contain precisely the variables that occur free in the corresponding body. For example, the body of the second rule is

 $\exists z (P(x) \land Sxzy \land X_1(x, y) \land X_2(x, x)),$

and the free variables of this CQ are x, y, the variables that occur also in the head of that rule.

Before we define the semantics of Datalog, let us consider the following simple example program.

 $egin{array}{rll} X_1(x) & :& - & P(x) \ X_2(x) & :& - & Q(x) \ X_1(x) & :& - & \exists y (Rxy \wedge X_1(y) \wedge X_2(y)) \end{array}$

This program is evaluated as follows on a τ -model \mathfrak{A} , where $\{P, Q, R\} \subseteq \tau$. Let X_1^0 be the empty unary relation \emptyset , and similarly, let X_2^0 also be the empty unary relation. These are both unary because $X_1(x)$ and $X_2(x)$ both have the one single free variable x. Now suppose we have defined X_1^n and X_2^n to be some unary relations over A. Let \mathfrak{A}^* be the model obtained from \mathfrak{A} by expanding the vocabulary by X_1 and X_2 and interpreting these relation symbols as the relations X_1^n and X_2^n . We let X_1^{n+1} be equal to the relation

 $\{a \in A \mid \mathfrak{A}^*, \{(x, a)\} \models P(x) \lor \exists y (Rxy \land X_1(y) \land X_2(y)) \}$

where $\{(x, a)\}$ is of course a variable assignment.

Intuitively, we therefore obtain X_1^{n+1} by taking the union of the relations that the X_1 -rule bodies define when each IDB-symbol X_i in the rule bodies is interpreted as X_i^n . Shortly

- 1. interpret each X_i as X_i^n ,
- 2. evaluate the rule bodies to obtain the relations defined by the bodies, and
- 3. let X_i^{n+1} be the union of the relations whose head variable X_i is.

Doing this, we observe that X_2^{n+1} is interpreted as the relation defined by Q(x), so it is somewhat less interesting here than X_1^{n+1} .

To define the semantics of DATALOG formally, let \mathfrak{A} be a τ -model. For each of the IDBs $X_i \in \{X_1, \ldots, X_m\}$, we define a corresponding operator F_{X_i} . To define the operators, let $ar(X_i)$ denote the arity of X_i . The operator F_{X_i} is the function

$$F_{X_i}: \mathcal{P}(A^{ar(X_1)}) imes \cdots imes \mathcal{P}(A^{ar(X_m)}) \quad o \quad \mathcal{P}(A^{ar(X_i)})$$

such that for any input relations U_1, \ldots, U_m of the appropriate arities (and over A), the function F_{X_i} outputs the relation...

...the relation

 $\{(a_1,\ldots,a_{ar(X_i)}) \mid \\ \mathfrak{A}[X_1 \mapsto U_1,\ldots,X_m \mapsto U_m], \{(x_{i,1},a_1),\ldots,(x_{i,ar(X_i)},a_{ar(X_i)})\} \models \bigvee_{i \in I} \varphi_i \}$

where $\bigvee_{i \in I} \varphi_i$ is the disjunction of those rule bodies that have X_i as head. Note indeed that $\{(x_{i,1}, a_1), \ldots, (x_{i,ar(X_i)}, a_{ar(X_i)})\}$ is simply a variable assignment and $\mathfrak{A}[X_1 \mapsto U_1, \ldots, X_m \mapsto U_m]$ the expansion of \mathfrak{A} with the symbols X_1, \ldots, X_m interpreted as the relations U_1, \ldots, U_m . (If some symbol X appears more than once in the list X_1, \ldots, X_m but two corresponding relations U_p and U_q are different in the list U_1, \ldots, U_m , then the output of the operator F_{X_i} can be defined arbitrarily on that input tuple (U_1, \ldots, U_m) . Such an output tuple is irrelevant for us here.)

We define $X_i^0 = \emptyset$, i.e., the empty relation of the same arity as X_i . We define X_i^{n+1} to be $F_{X_i}(X_1^n, \ldots, X_m^n)$.

Note that, as defined so far, a DATALOG-program simply corresponds to a system that makes the relations corresponding to the rule head variables X_1, \ldots, X_m evolve in a stepwise fashion. This is ok, but we would also like to make sense of statements of the form $\mathfrak{A} \models \Pi$, where Π is a DATALOG-program. To do this, the first step is to allow **nullary** IDBs.

Let \mathfrak{A} be a model. A nullary relation Y over A is a set $Y \subseteq A^0 = \{\emptyset\}$. Thus either $Y = \emptyset$ or $Y = \{\emptyset\}$. If $Y = \emptyset$, we associate it with the truth value **false**, and if $Y = \{\emptyset\}$, we associate it with the truth value **true**. We typically write $Y = \top$ and $Y = \bot$ instead of $Y = \{\emptyset\}$ and $Y = \emptyset$. A model \mathfrak{A} whose vocabulary contains a nullary relation symbol Y, satisfies the formula Y (i.e., $\mathfrak{A} \models Y$) if and only if Y is interpreted as \top .

The syntax of DATALOG with nullary IDB is the same as the syntax specified above, with the addition that nullary IDBs can be head variables and the bodies of rules with nullary head variables must be Boolean conjunctive queries, i.e., conjunctive queries without free variables. For example

$$egin{array}{rcl} X_1(x)&:&-&P(x)\ X_2&:&-&\exists x Q(x)\ X_3&:&-&\exists x \exists y (Rxy \wedge X_1(y) \wedge X_2) \end{array}$$

is a DATALOG-program where the IDBs X_2 and X_3 are nullary and thus the corresponding CQs have no free variables.

Also the semantics remains the same. The nullary IDBs are first equal to \perp , and then we start iterating (i.e., running) the program. A nullary IDB X_i becomes true if one of the bodies of the X_i -rules becomes true.

Formally, let \mathfrak{A} be a τ -model. Let Π be program with m rules and with the IDBs X_1, \ldots, X_m some of which can be nullary (and some of these IDBs can be the same). For each of the IDBs $X_i \in \{X_1, \ldots, X_m\}$, we define a corresponding operator F_{X_i} . Let $ar(X_i)$ denote the arity of X_i . The operator F_{X_i} is the function

$$F_{X_i}: \mathcal{P}(A^{ar(X_1)}) \times \cdots \times \mathcal{P}(A^{ar(X_m)}) \quad \rightarrow \quad \mathcal{P}(A^{ar(X_i)})$$

such that for any input relations U_1, \ldots, U_m of the appropriate arities (and over A), the function F_{X_i} outputs the relation

$$\{(a_1,\ldots,a_{ar(X_i)}) \mid \\ \mathfrak{A}[X_1 \mapsto U_1,\ldots,X_m \mapsto U_m], \{(x_{i,1},a_1),\ldots,(x_{i,ar(X_i)},a_{ar(X_i)})\} \models \bigvee_{i \in I} \varphi_i \}$$

where $\bigvee_{i \in I} \varphi_i$ is the disjunction of the rule bodies whose head IDB is X_i . Note that if X_j is nullary, then $\mathfrak{A}[X_1 \mapsto U_1, \ldots, X_m \mapsto U_m] \models X_j$ if and only if $U_j = \top$. Note also that a nullary IDB X_j evaluates to \top if at least one of the X_j -rules has a body that evaluates to true. Continues...

Note also that if X_i is nullary, then F_{X_i} outputs \top if

$$\mathfrak{A}[X_1\mapsto U_1,\ldots,X_m\mapsto U_m]\models\bigvee_{i\in I}\varphi_i$$

and otherwise F_{X_i} outputs \perp .

If X_i is nullary, we define $X_i^0 = \bot$, and when X_i is not nullary, we define $X_i^0 = \emptyset$, i.e., the empty relation of the same arity as X_i . We define X_i^{n+1} to be $F_{X_i}(X_1^n, \ldots, X_m^n)$ in both cases (nullary and not nullary).

In addition to the usual IDBs, we let X_{goal} be a special, distinguished nullary IDB. If Π is a DATALOG-program, we define that $\mathfrak{A} \models \Pi$ if there exists some *n* such that $X_{goal}^n = \top$.

Let *P* and *Q* be unary relations and *R* a binary relation. Define a DATALOGprogram Π such that $\mathfrak{A} \models \Pi$ if and only if there is some node *u* in *P* and some node *v* in *Q* such that u = v or $(u, v) \in R$ or

$$(u, a_1) \in R \land (a_1, a_2) \in R \land \dots \land (a_i, v) \in R$$

for some *i*.

$$egin{array}{rcl} X_1(x) & :& - & Q(x) \ X_1(x) & :& - & \exists y(Rxy \wedge X_1(x)) \ X_{goal} & :& - & \exists x(Px \wedge X_1(x)) \end{array}$$

Write a DATALOG-program Π such that $\mathfrak{A} \models \Pi$ if the binary relation S has a tuple $(u, v) \in S$ such that the inverse tuple (v, u) belongs to the transitive closure of the binary relation R.

Write a DATALOG-program Π such that $\mathbb{G} \models \Pi$ if the graph \mathbb{G} is not two-colorable.

To simplify notation when writing DATALOG programs, we typically do not write the existential quantifier $\exists x$ explicitly, as it is clear that every variable that is not in the head must be existentially quantified. Also, we can use commas instead of conjunctions. Thus

becomes

Despite their limitations, CQs are nevertheless a highly flexible framework capable of expressing the most typical queries. Also, being simple (and not too expressive), they are efficient to implement. One of the most common extensions of CQs (and still a fragment of FO unlike DATALOG) is the collection of queries known as UCQs, with UCQ standing for an **union of conjunctive queries**. A UCQ is simply a disjunction of conjunctive queries. A query is a **Boolean** UCQ if it has no free variables.

Consider the vocabulary $\{P, Q\}$ where both P and Q are unary. Now, $Px \lor Qx$ is a simple UCQ that returns all elements in P and Q. It is easy to see that there exists no CQ that can do that job.

We next discuss modal logic, which is probably the most popular framework of logics from the point of view of current applications. The field has its roots in philosophy, and the related research is still very active. However, the main applications nowadays lie in computer science—in particulal artificial intelligence, verification and knowledge representation. There are also various systems of modal logic that deal with the foundations of mathematics, e.g., *provability logic* that deals with the notions of provability and non-provability.

Modal logic is actually not a single logic, but a framework for different kinds of systems with similar features. However, there is a core modal logic, often also (confusingly) called **modal logic**. We shall call this core system ML. Let **PROP** be a countably infinite set of unary relation symbols, called **proposition symbols** in modal logic. The set of formulae of ML is the smallest set *F* such that the following conditions are satisfied.

- 1. If $P \in PROP$, then $P \in F$.
- 2. If $\varphi \in F$, then $\neg \varphi \in F$.
- 3. If $\varphi, \psi \in F$, then $\varphi \wedge \psi \in F$.
- 4. If $\varphi \in F$, then $\Diamond \varphi \in F$.

Recall that a Kripke model or Kripke structure is a model

$\mathfrak{M} = (W, R, (P_i)_{i \in I})$

where $R \subseteq W \times W$ is a binary relation and each $P_i \subseteq W$ is a unary relation. The modal logic ML is interpreted with respect to **pointed models** (\mathfrak{M}, w) , where \mathfrak{M} is a Kripke model and $w \in W$ is an element in the domain W of the Kripke model.

The semantics of the modal logic $\underline{\mathrm{ML}}$ is given as follows.

$$\begin{array}{lll} (\mathfrak{M},w) \models P_i & \Leftrightarrow & w \in P_i^{\mathfrak{M}} \\ (\mathfrak{M},w) \models \varphi \land \psi & \Leftrightarrow & (\mathfrak{M},w) \models \varphi \text{ and } (\mathfrak{M},w) \models \psi \\ (\mathfrak{M},w) \models \neg \varphi & \Leftrightarrow & (\mathfrak{M},w) \not\models \varphi \\ (\mathfrak{M},w) \models \Diamond \varphi & \Leftrightarrow & \text{there exists some } v \text{ such that} \\ & & & & & & & \\ (w,v) \in R^{\mathfrak{M}} \text{ and } (\mathfrak{M},v) \models \varphi \end{array}$$

We use the familiar abbreviations

- $\blacktriangleright \varphi \lor \psi = \neg (\neg \varphi \land \neg \psi),$
- $\blacktriangleright \varphi \to \psi = \neg \varphi \quad \lor \quad \psi,$
- $\blacktriangleright \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi = (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \land (\psi \rightarrow \varphi).$

We also use the abbreviation $\Box \varphi = \neg \Diamond \neg \varphi$.

Modal logic was originally motivated by the philosophy of the notions of **possibility** and **necessity**. In a Kripke model $\mathfrak{M} = (W, R, (P_i)_{i=1})$, every domain element $w \in W$ is considered to be a **world**, or a **state of affairs**. Indeed, we say that w satisfies the proposition P_i if and only if $w \in P^{\mathfrak{M}}$ (i.e., we have $(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models P_i$). Thus w is associated with precisely those propositions that w satisfies.

Let \mathbb{P}_w denote the set of propositions satisfied by w. The world w, or the *state of affairs* w, is thus specified by—or somehow identified with—the set \mathbb{P}_w that w satisfies. For example, suppose

 $(P_i)_{i \in I} = (P_1, P_2) = (\text{It_is_raining, it_is_shining}),$

so we have two propositions, one stating that it is raining and the other one that it is shining. Suppose $W = \{w_1, w_2\}$ such that w_1 satisfies P_1 and $\neg P_2$ while w_2 satisfies $\neg P_1$ and P_2 . Thus we have two worlds, one where it is raining and one where it is shining.

Now, suppose $(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models \Diamond P_i$. This means that there exists some v such that $(w, v) \in R^{\mathfrak{M}}$ and we have $(\mathfrak{M}, v) \models P_i$. The inclusion $(w, v) \in R^{\mathfrak{M}}$ is interpreted to mean that v is a possible alternative (to w) state of affairs. Thereby $(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models \Diamond P_i$ states that there exists an alternative (to w) state of affairs v that satisfies P_i . In other words, $(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models \Diamond P_i$ states that in w, it is possible that P_i . The operator \Diamond is thus called the possibility operator. We can read $\Diamond P_i$ as '*it is possible that* P_i '. Similarly for any formula φ of ML, we can read $\Diamond \varphi$ as '*it is possible that* φ '.

Recall that \Box is an abbreviation for $\neg \Diamond \neg$. Thereby $\Box P_i$ states that $\neg P_i$ is impossible, i.e., P_i is *necessarily* true. Thus \Box is called the *necessity* operator, and we can give $\Box P_i$ the reading that '*it is necessary that* P_i '.

The possibility operator \Diamond is also called the **diamond** and the necessity operator \Box the **box**.

In addition to using proposition symbols P_i with indices *i*, we often use symbols P and Q to denote propositions.

Consider the pictured Kripke model with domain $W = \{w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3\}$ and such that the proposition P is satisfied by w_0 only, i.e., $P^{\mathfrak{M}} = \{w_0\}$.



Now $(\mathfrak{M}, w_0) \models \Diamond \neg P$ because there exists a world accessible (in one step from w_0 via R) that satisfies $\neg P$. In other words, the condition

 $\exists v : (w, v) \in R \text{ and } (\mathfrak{M}, v) \models \neg P$

holds. This is because, e.g., $(\mathfrak{M}, w_1) \models \neg P$.

Let us further investigate the model \mathfrak{M} , pictured again below.



We have $(\mathfrak{M}, w_0) \models \Box \neg P$ because for all worlds v accessible (in one step from w_0 via R), we have $(\mathfrak{M}, v) \models \neg P$.

Exercise: For each world $v \in \{w_0, w_1, w_2, w_3\}$, find a formula φ_v satisfied only by v but not the other worlds.

A possible solution:

- $(\mathfrak{M}, w_0) \models P$ while none of the other worlds satisfies P.
- $(\mathfrak{M}, w_1) \models \Diamond P$ while no other world satisfies this formula.
- $(\mathfrak{M}, w_2) \models \neg P \land \Diamond \Diamond P$ while no other world satisfies this formula.
- $(\mathfrak{M}, w_3) \models \neg P \land \Box \Box \Box P$ while no other world satisfies this formula.

The modal logic ML is a variable-free system. However, it can be conceived simply as a simple fragment of first-order logic. The **standard translation** is a function that maps formulae of ML to formulae of first-order logic as follows.

- $\blacktriangleright \operatorname{St}_{x}(P) = P(x)$
- ▶ $\operatorname{St}_y(P) = P(y)$
- $\blacktriangleright \operatorname{St}_{\mathsf{x}}(\neg \varphi) = \neg \operatorname{St}_{\mathsf{x}}(\varphi)$
- $\blacktriangleright \operatorname{St}_{y}(\neg \varphi) = \neg \operatorname{St}_{y}(\varphi)$
- $\operatorname{St}_{x}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \operatorname{St}_{x}(\varphi) \wedge \operatorname{St}_{x}(\psi)$
- $\operatorname{St}_{y}(\varphi \wedge \psi) = \operatorname{St}_{y}(\varphi) \wedge \operatorname{St}_{y}(\psi)$
- $\operatorname{St}_{x}(\Diamond \varphi) = \exists y (R(x,y) \wedge \operatorname{St}_{y}(\varphi))$
- $\operatorname{St}_{y}(\Diamond \varphi) = \exists x (R(y,x) \land \operatorname{St}_{x}(\varphi))$

Note that $\operatorname{St}_{x}(\varphi)$ has the free variable x and $\operatorname{St}_{y}(\varphi)$ the free variable y.

This translation leads to the following theorem.

Theorem 7.2 Let φ be a formula of ML. Consider a Kripke model \mathfrak{M} and an arbitrary variable assignment f. Suppose \mathfrak{M} contains a point w. We have

 $(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models \varphi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathfrak{M}, f[x \mapsto w] \models \operatorname{St}_{x}(\varphi).$

Before justifying the theorem, notice that intuitively, the theorem states that in some sense ML can be seen as a fragment of first-order logic FO. At least the modal logic ML translates into formulae $\psi(x) = \operatorname{St}_{x}(\varphi)$ of modal logic that can—in some sense—be seen equivalent to the original formulae φ .

Proof. For proving Theorem 7.2, simply recall the semantics of ML:

It is easy to observe that the translation $\rm St$ simply translates the semantics of $\rm ML$ into first-order logic. The nontrivial case is the clause

$$\operatorname{St}_{x}(\Diamond \varphi) = \exists y \Big(R(x,y) \wedge \operatorname{St}_{y}(\varphi) \Big)$$

for the diamond \Diamond . The other cases are indeed clear.

The most common way of proving undefinability results for ML is by using **bisimulations**. A bisimulation is a binary relation $Z \subseteq A \times B$ between the domains of two Kripke models \mathfrak{A} and \mathfrak{B} (over the same vocabulary τ) that satisfies the following conditions.

1. If $(a, b) \in Z$, then the elements a and b satisfy the same propositions, i.e., we have

$$(\mathfrak{A}, a) \models P_i \Leftrightarrow (\mathfrak{B}, b) \models P_i$$

for all propositions P_i in τ .

- 2. If $(a, b) \in Z$ and $(a, a') \in R^{\mathfrak{A}}$, then there exists a point $b' \in B$ such that $(b, b') \in R^{\mathfrak{B}}$ and $(a', b') \in Z$.
- 3. If $(a, b) \in Z$ and $(b, b') \in R^{\mathfrak{B}}$, then there exists a point $a' \in A$ such that $(a, a') \in R^{\mathfrak{A}}$ and $(a', b') \in Z$.

Theorem 7.3 Let $Z \subseteq A \times B$ be a bisimulation between \mathfrak{A} and \mathfrak{B} . If $(a, b) \in Z$, then we have

 $(\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{a}) \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow (\mathfrak{B}, \mathbf{b}) \models \varphi$

for all formulae φ of the modal logic ML.

Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the structure of formulae. Suppose φ is a proposition symbol *P*. Then, directly by the definition of bisimulation, (\mathfrak{A}, a) and (\mathfrak{B}, b) satisfy the same propositions. Continues...

Now suppose φ is $\psi \wedge \chi$. Now

$$(\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{a}) \models \psi \land \chi$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \qquad (\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{a}) \models \psi \text{ and } (\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{a}) \models \chi$$

$$\stackrel{ind.hypot.}{\Leftrightarrow} \qquad (\mathfrak{B}, b) \models \psi \text{ and } (\mathfrak{B}, b) \models \chi$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \qquad (\mathfrak{B}, b) \models \psi \land \chi.$$

Now suppose φ is $\neg \psi$. We have

 $(\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{a}) \models \neg \psi$ $\Leftrightarrow \qquad (\mathfrak{A}, \mathbf{a}) \not\models \psi$ $\stackrel{ind.hypot.}{\Leftrightarrow} \qquad (\mathfrak{B}, \mathbf{b}) \not\models \psi$ $\Leftrightarrow \qquad (\mathfrak{B}, \mathbf{b}) \models \neg \psi.$

Suppose finally that φ is $\Diamond \psi$. Assume that $(\mathfrak{A}, a) \models \Diamond \psi$. Thus there exists a' such that $(a, a') \in R^{\mathfrak{A}}$ and $(\mathfrak{A}, a') \models \psi$. By the definition of the bisimulation relation Z, since $(a, a') \in R^{\mathfrak{A}}$ and $(a, b) \in Z$, there exists b' such that $(b, b') \in R^{\mathfrak{B}}$ and $(a', b') \in Z$. Since $(a', b') \in Z$ and $(\mathfrak{A}, a') \models \psi$, we have $(\mathfrak{B}, b') \models \psi$ by the induction hypothesis. Therefore, since $(b, b') \in R^{\mathfrak{B}}$, we have $(\mathfrak{B}, b) \models \Diamond \psi$. We have therefore proved that $(\mathfrak{A}, a) \models \Diamond \psi \Rightarrow (\mathfrak{B}, b) \models \Diamond \psi$. The converse implication is proved similarly.

Example 7.4

Let $A = \{a_1, a_2, a_3\}$ and $B = \{b_1, b_2\}$ and define $R^{\mathfrak{A}} = \{(a_1, a_2), (a_1, a_3)\}$ and $R^{\mathfrak{B}} = \{(b_1, b_2)\}$. Let $P^{\mathfrak{A}} = \{a_2, a_3\}$ and $P^{\mathfrak{B}} = \{b_2\}$. Consider the Kripke models $\mathfrak{A} = (A, R^{\mathfrak{A}}, P^{\mathfrak{A}})$ and $\mathfrak{B} = (B, R^{\mathfrak{B}}, P^{\mathfrak{B}})$ (sketch the models). Consider the relation $Z = \{(a_1, b_1), (a_2, b_2), (a_3, b_2)\}$ (sketch the relation). This relation is clearly a bisimulation. It connects both a_2 and a_3 to the point b_2 , so (\mathfrak{A}, a_2) and (\mathfrak{A}, a_3) satisfy the same modal formulae as (\mathfrak{B}, b_2) . The bisimulation Z also connects a_1 to b_1 , so (\mathfrak{A}, a_1) and (\mathfrak{B}, b_1) satisfy the same modal formulae.

Definition 7.5

The modal depth $md(\varphi)$ of a formula φ of ML is defined as follows.

- $\blacktriangleright md(P_i) = 0$
- $md(\varphi \land \psi) = max(md(\varphi), md(\psi))$
- $\blacktriangleright md(\neg \varphi) = md(\varphi)$
- $\blacktriangleright md(\Diamond \varphi) = md(\varphi) + 1$

Therefore, the modal depth of a formula is simply the maximum nesting depth of diamonds in the formula.

Earlier on we proved that there exist only finitely many non-equivalent formulae of first-order logic over a finite vocabulary τ and with quantifierrank at most *m*. The modal logic ML can be seen as a fragment of firstorder logic (recall the translation St), and therefore it is obvious that an analogous result holds also for ML. We shall now formulate and prove that result (without resorting to the earlier result on FO).

Definition 7.6

Let φ and ψ be formulae of the modal logic ML. We say that φ and ψ are **equivalent** if for all pointed Kripke models (\mathfrak{A}, w) and (\mathfrak{B}, u) that interpret the proposition symbols in φ and ψ , we have

$$(\mathfrak{A}, w) \models \varphi \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad (\mathfrak{B}, u) \models \psi.$$

We denote this by writing $\varphi \equiv \psi$.

Theorem 7.7

Let $\pi \subseteq PROP$ be a finite, nonempty set of proposition symbols. Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$. There exist only finitely many non-equivalent formulae up to modal depth n and with the proposition symbols in π . More rigorously, there exists a finite set F of formulae of ML using the proposition symbols in π and with modal depth up to n such that the following holds:

If φ is an arbitrary formula with the proposition symbols in π and with modal depth up to n, then there exists a formula $\psi \in F$ such that $\varphi \equiv \psi$.

Before we work through the proof, it is indeed worth noting that the claim of the theorem follows also from Theorem 3.8.

Proof (Sketch). Let $\pi = \{P_1, \ldots, P_k\}$. We prove the claim by induction on modal depth. We begin with some auxiliary definitions.

Let F be a finite set $\{\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k\}$ of formulae of ML. Now, a **full description** is a formula $\chi_1 \land \cdots \land \chi_k$ where each χ_i is either φ_i or $\neg \varphi_i$. Clearly, as in our related argument for first-order logic earlier on, we see that every Boolean combination of formulae in F is equivalent to a disjunction of full descriptions.¹

¹Note that the disjunction $\bigvee \emptyset$ is defined equivalent to a contradiction (as disjunction requires that at least one of the given formulae holds). We can always encode $\bigvee \emptyset$ by some formula, for example $P_1 \land \neg P_1$.

Now define that a 0-type is a full description over $\pi = \{P_1, \ldots, P_k\}$. Recursively, suppose we have defined the set of *m*-types, and denote this set by F_m . An (m + 1)-type is any formula

 ψ_{m}

where $G \subseteq F_m$ is a set of *m*-types and $\psi_m \in F_m$ some *m*-type. Thus an (m+1)-type specifies the following:

 $\wedge \qquad \qquad \bigwedge_{\substack{\psi \in G}} \Diamond \psi \\ \wedge \qquad \qquad \qquad \bigwedge_{\substack{\psi \in F_m \setminus G}} \neg \Diamond \psi$

1. The *m*-type ψ_m of the current point (of a pointed model).

 \wedge

- 2. The complete set $G \subseteq F_m$ of *m*-types that are accessible via *R* from the current point (i.e., positive information about *m*-types of directly accessible points).
- 3. The complete set $F_m \setminus G$ of *m*-types that are not accessible from the current point via *R* (i.e., negative information about *m*-types of directly accessible points).

Thus an (m + 1)-type can be seen as a complete description of a domain point in terms of formulae of modal depth up to (m + 1). It is not difficult to see that therefore every formula of modal depth up to ℓ and with propositions in $\pi = \{P_1, \ldots, P_k\}$ is equivalent to some disjunction of ℓ -types. By the construction of ℓ -types, it is easy to see that there are finitely many ℓ -types.

We now *informally sketch* a proof that ML has the **finite model property**, i.e., the property that for all formulae φ of ML, if there exists a (possibly infinite) pointed model (\mathfrak{M}, w) such that $(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models \varphi$, then there exists a *finite* model \mathfrak{N} and a point u of \mathfrak{N} such that $(\mathfrak{N}, u) \models \varphi$. The full details of the argument are skipped. The argument requires an understanding of equivalence relations and equivalence classes, so a reader not familiar with these notions can safely skip over the argument.

So, let φ be a formula of ML and suppose $(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models \varphi$. Let π be the set of proposition symbols in φ and n the modal depth $md(\varphi)$ of φ . Define an equivalence relation $\sim \subseteq M \times M$ such that $(u, v) \in \sim$ if and only if (\mathfrak{M}, u) and (\mathfrak{M}, v) satisfy the same *n*-type. (It can easily be shown that every element u of any model \mathfrak{A} satisfies precisely one *n*-type.) For each element u of \mathfrak{M} , let [u] denote the set

 $\{v \in M \mid v \text{ satisfies the } n\text{-type of } u\}.$

That is, [u] is the equivalence class of u with respect to \sim .

Define the following Kripke model \mathfrak{N} .

- 1. The domain N is the set $\{ [u] | u \in M \}$ of equivalence classes [u] of elements u of the model \mathfrak{M} .
- 2. $([u], [v]) \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathfrak{N}}$ if and only if the (n-1)-type ψ_v^{n-1} of (\mathfrak{M}, v) is such that the *n*-type of (\mathfrak{M}, u) has the conjunct $\Diamond \psi_v^{n-1}$.
- 3. We have $[u] \in P^{\mathfrak{N}}$ if and only if the 0-type of u has the conjunct P.

It can be shown with a relatively straightforward argument (skipped here) that

$$(\mathfrak{M}, w) \models \varphi \Leftrightarrow (\mathfrak{N}, [w]) \models \varphi$$

holds for all formulae φ with proposition symbols in π and up to modal depth *n*. Therefore ML indeed has the finite model property: if φ is true in a pointed model (\mathfrak{M}, w) , construct the model $(\mathfrak{N}, [w])$ which is clearly finite (as there are finitely many *n*-types) and observe that $(\mathfrak{N}, [w]) \models \varphi$.